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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to review the trends in railroad transport
in recent years in four African countries—Zimbabwe, Zambia, Tanzania, Sudan.
The Zimbabwe system has by far the heaviest traffic volume, the Sudan Rail-
ways the greatest mileage and number of employees. Two of the systems show
operating profits; all show overall deficits, but this is accepted in view
of their contributions to development. Only the Zimbabwe lines can handle
all of the traffic available to them; the situation is particularly bad in
Tanzania and the Sudan. This problem and the inadequate service result
primarily from deteriorated track (much of it now being rebuilt), inadequate
equipment maintenance, and lack of adequate trained personnel. The govern-
ments place substantial stress on improved rail performance, primarily
because of the general belief, supported by considerable evidence, that rail
transport is substantially cheaper than road transport and less of a drain,
for given traffic, on foreign exchange. Some loss to road transport is
occurring because of continued use of value of service tariffs in all of
the countries except Tanzania, which has shifted to a cost-based tariff.
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Rail transport in Africa began in the colonial days, the lines
built partly for military reasons, partly to allow exploitation of mineral
deposits, export of farm products, and import of manufactured goods.
Typically built inland from the coast, they were not designed for inter-
country trade, nor were they ideal for internal economic development.
They were built cheaply, and to narrow guage, 1.067 meters (3r feet) typically
in the British colonies (but not in all), 1 meter in most others. After
independence, one major line (Tazara) was built, some lines were extended,
and some connecting links built. On the whole, however, despite some
improvements, in many respects most systems have deteriorated in recent
decades. It is the purpose of this paper to review the recent experience
in detail in three African countries, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, and the Sudan,
with some reference to the system in Zambia.
1. Two articles by the author in 1979 and 1980 covered a somewhat
larger number of countries and were based on data up to 1976 for the most
part: John F. Due, "The Problems of Rail Transport in Tropical Africa,"
Journal of Developing Areas
.
Vol. 13 (July 1979), pp. 375"93, and "The
Economic Viability of the Railways of Tropical Africa," Journal of Develop-
ment Economics . Vol. 7 (June 1980), pp. 263-72. Material in these articles
is not included in this paper with minor exceptions.
Other earlier references include Anthony M. O'Connor, Railways and
Development in Uganda
.
East African Institute of Social Research, East
African Studies #18 (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1965) ; Rolf Hofmeier,
Transport and Economic Development in Tanzania (Munich: Weltforum Verlag, 1973)
»
Alan R. Prest, Transport Economics in Developing Countries (New York: Praeger,
1969) ; Arthur Hazlewood, Rail and Road in East Africa (Oxford: Basil Blackwood,
1964).
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PART I. ZIMBABWE
Zimbabwe is served more completely by rail service than most Tropical
African countries, with 3^+00 km. of line, reaching all the major towns and
economically developed areas. The lines handle substantial traffic within
the country as well as important export-import and transit traffic. The
railway was built by the Rhodesian Railways, originally a private company
later taken over by the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. The Rhodesia
portion passed to that government following the breakup of the Federation,
and was separated in 1965 from the northern portion, which became Zambia
Railways. The line reached Bulawayo in 1897,built north from Gape Town via
Botswana (then Bechuanaland) by the Rhodes interests in the 1890s to avoid
the Boer states. A separate line from Beira to Salisbury (Harare) was
completed in 1898, and the lines were joined shortly thereafter. The line
north to Zambia was built shortly after the turn of the century. Two major
lines came much later, a direct route to Lorenco Marques (now Maputo) in
the late 1950s, and a connection with South African Railways at Beitbridge,
completed in 197^-
As of 1983, the system consists of several major routes, plus a group
of branch lines (Fig. l)
.
1. The heavy-volume line from Harare south to Gweru (formerly Gwelo),
where it forks:
(a) One line continues to Bulawayo, where it joins the line coming down
from Zambia, which crosses the Zambesi at Victoria Falls, and continues on
T! This portion of the paper is based on information provided by the
National Railways of Zimbabwe; Zimbabwe, Ministry of Economic Planning and
Development, Annual Economic Review of Zimbabwe , August 1981; Zimbabwe Central
Statistical Office, Monthly Digest of Statistics . August 1982; "Transport:
A Development Magazine Special Feature," Development (Harare), Sept. 1982,
pp. iii-xxi; "NRZ Performance Improves," Commerce (Harare), June 1982, pp. 7-9
•
-3-
ZIMBABWE
Scale of Kilometres
10 iG 120 '60 :m m
n *
ZAIRE
> TANZANIA
SOUTH 1^
AHJCA, -,lV" / T °
SOUTH AfRICA
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
Ofwm In th« 'j«k>fteal Surrey Oflfefc SsJObvrjr.
Source: Annual Economic Review of Zimbabwe , August 1981.
southward, via Botswana, to a connection with South African Railways at
Mar eking. Zimbabwe Railways operates the line in Botswana, having taken it
over from South African Railways, the last portion in 1966.
(b) The other line goes southeastward to Rutenga, where it forks, one
line going east to a junction with Mozambique Railways at Chicualacuala,
providing a direct line to Maputo, the other going south to connect with
South African Railways at Beitbridge.
2. The major line southeastward from Harare to Mutare (formerly Umtali)
and a connection with the Mozambique Railways.
3. The branch lines:
(a) North from Harare, to Shamva and Sinoia, servicing a major agri-
cultural area and chrome mines at Sinoia.
(b) Gweru-Fort Victoria, a light traffic line, with some asbestos and
farm product traffic.
(c) Gweru-Seluke, handling chrome ore.
(d) In the southeast, a branch off the Maputo line, serving the sugar
producing area of Ghiredzi.
(e) From a point near Bulawayo to West Nicholson, serving a manufacturing
plant
.
The Export Traffic Flows
For decades, the principal export and import traffic to the ports flowed
through Beira (particularly from Harare and northern Zimbabwe), and through
Maputo (traffic from Zambia and Zaire, and southern Zimbabwe). But a combina-
tion of loss of trained personnel and guerrilla activities in Mozambique
have greatly restricted use of these two routes and the port of Beira.
One freight train a day—about 400 tons— is handled through to Beira,
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primarily export of tobacco and maize, with virtually no import traffic.
The direct line to Maputo has not "been operable for six months or more; some
traffic moves through Maputo, but via the old route through South Africa
with only a few miles of track in Mozambique. The consequence is that most
of the port traffic is going via South Africa, to the Indian Ocean ports,
especially Durban, and Capetown. The Capetown traffic is handled through
Botswana, the Indian Ocean and Johannesburg area traffic via Beitbridge,
with about equal volumes of traffic on the two routes. Much of the Zambia
and Zaire traffic is handled in the same way. Tazara has been operating to
only a small fraction of its potential capacity, the port of Dar es Salaam
has been congested, and the Benguela Railway to the Atlantic coast is still
not operating because of guerrilla activity in Angola.
The use of South African rail lines and ports is not only contrary to
the preferences of the governments of Zambia and Zimbabwe but it is also
much more expensive. For example, for a typical carload shipment the rate
from Harare to Maputo, 1262 km, is Z$820 , via Komatipoort in South Africa,
1,481 km and $1,359; via Durban, 2,081 km, $1,658. The hope of course is
that the efficiency of Mozambique Railways and the ports will improve so that
the traffic can again be routed via Beira and Maputo.
The largest volume of import traffic is in fertilizer, plus increasing
numbers of containers; about 1,000 a month are currently being received in
Harare. Maize and chrome are the largest export commodities. There is
substantial local traffic— coal from Wankie (near Victoria Falls), to the
smelters at QueQue and elsewhere, movements of ore, of steel, of maize and
1. It is reported that copper traffic from Zambia through Zimbabwe in
mid 1982 was about 50,000 tons a month, from a previous figure of 20,000
tons. "NRZ Performance," Commerce , op. cit., p. 9.
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other farm products, tea, tobacco, lumber, machinery, and some cattle.
The Botawana line generates considerable cattle traffic, as well as coal
and ore.
Table 1 shows revenue by type of traffic over the last decade. Goal,
agricultural products, mineral products, and basic metal products are about
of equal importance, but these yield in total only 38% of the freight
revenue; the traffic is much more diversified than in many countries.
Track and Equipment . The railway was built to the 1,067 meter Gape
guage used throughout southern and central Africa. The track is currently
in good condition, although some will need upgrading in anticipation of
heavier traffic volume; some 45 kg (about 100 pounds) per meter rail is
currently being replaced by 5^ kg (about 120 pound) rail.
As of the beginning of 1982, the railway had 275 diesel locomotives,
of a great variety of different origins. During the year 6l new General
Motors diesels were acquired from Canada and the United States. Commencing
in 1977 the railway made the decision to rebuild many of its steam locomotives;
it now has 87 rebuilt ones, all Beyer-Garretts. The work was done in
Bulawayo; the engines were given new fireboxes, bearings, and boilers. They
are used on freight and passenger trains from Bulawayo to Victoria Falls
and Gweru. The decision was made because the country has extensive coal
deposits but no oil. The intent is to use them at least for the next 10 to
15 years.
Decision was also made to begin electrification of the main lines in
1981; in 1983 the section between Harare and the yards south of Gweru will
be completed, with electric locomotives acquired from Europe. Under present
plans the electrification will be extended over the next several years to
Bulawayo and Beitbridge.
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Table 1
Revenue by Type of Traffic, National Railways of Zimbabwe, 1968-1982
Years ending June 30 except 1982
1
Z$000s
Year Passenger
Services
Agricultural
Products
Goal Minerals Basic
Metal
Products
Other Total*
1968
1969
3,719
3,802
3,622
3,1^
3,810
5,^35
3,957
3,649
3,308
10,698
28,470
30,055
52,586
57,401
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
3,881
4,064
4,477
5,038
5,191
6,468
5,052
5,873
5,963
5,871
6,144
5,338
4,520
5,156
6,998
4,128
3,528
4,489
4,458
5,031
10,902
11,963
13,274
9,492
5,496
29,286
30,732
32,431
32,834
33,1^6
61,359
61,280
65,776
63,692
63,003
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
6,032
6,426
6,308
6,061
5,220
7,144
7,922
8,995
10, '018
13,649
5,971
8,492
9,479
9,015
11 , 694
6,022
8,869
9,973
3,707
9,738
6,516
9,577
9,858
10,212
19,103
38,812
36,050
37,039
35,720
41,624
71,666
78,75^
83,273
81,322
102,841
1980
1981
1982**
5,221
8,113
9,113
12,698
17,216
19,398
14,222
14,969
17,489
10,196
13,058
12,148
11,267
10,035
11,868
72,962
88,137
84,453
128,244
153,969
157,882
* including miscellaneous
** through May
Source: Zimbabwe, Monthly Digest of Statistics , August 1982, table 17-2.
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The system shops are located in Bulawayo, together with the general
offices. The railroad builds its own freight cars and passenger coaches;
as of early 1982 it had 13,000 freight cars and 460 passenger coaches. Shops
are also located in Mutare.
A major new mechanical hump yard, capable of handling 96 freight trains
(30 cars) a day was recently completed at Dabuka, south of Gwelo.
Passenger Service . The major passenger train operates overnight
between Harare and Bulawayo, the two principal cities. Overnight trains
also operate from Harare to Mutere, and from Bulawayo to Victoria Falls.
The railroad has tried day trains but finds a preference for overnight
service. At one time numerous through trains were operated to neighboring
countries— to Lusaka and the Copper Belt in Zambia; from Bulawayo through
Harare to Beira (daily), from Harare to Maputo twice weekly, and three times
a week to Gape Town, three times to Johannesburg. The only one remaining
of these (late 1982) is once a week service to Johannesburg, though there
has been consideration of restoration of through service to Zambia (Zambia
Railways service ends at Livingstone, Zimbabwe at Victoria Falls) . Passenger
service yields only % of total revenue, and the railway is not particularly
interested in expanding it. There are still four classes, the first and
second class having sleeper berths on the overnight runs. The number of
passengers fell drastically after 1975, to one-third of the top year (1973)
but has been rising since 1980.
Trends in Traffic Volume
Table 2 shows the figures of freight tonnage and passengers from 1972
through 1982. The freight trend has been irregular but upward, the 1981
figure being h% above that for 1972. The traffic dropped in the Spring
-9-
Table 2
Freight Tonnage and Passengers Carried
National Railways of Zimbabwe, 1968-1982
Year Total
Revenue Tons
Gross Ton KM Net Ton KM Passengers Carried
000s 000,000s 000,000s 000s
1968 9,077 13,027 5,380 3,130
1969 9,500 13,471 5,615 2,857
1970 10,846 14,411 6,500 2,814
1971 10,768 14,283 6,293 2,782
1972 11 , 498 15,303 6,802 3,013
1973 11,598 15,194 6,628 3,236
197^ 11,801 14,600 6,190 3,oio
1975 12,018 14,686 6,141 3,127
1976 12,845 14,670 6,358 3", 105
1977 12,108 13,957 6,104 2,613
1978 11,191 12,792 5,588 2,227
1979 11 , 621 13,391 6,149 1,574
1980 12,687 14,167 6,864 991
1981 13,153 13,540 6,610 1,580
1982* 11,310 11,774 5,717 1,678
* through May 31
Source: Zimbabwe, Monthly Digest of Statistics , August 1982, table 17.1.
-10-
of 1982 because of the depressed economy, but was still well above earlier
levels. The patterns, however, of freight movements have shifted sharply
over the years. Once most of the export traffic of Zambia flowed through
Zimbabwe on the way to Indian Ocean ports; this was cut off by LTDI (the Zaire
traffic, which Zambia would handle, was not cut) . This flow resumed somewhat
after independence, aided by the difficulties on.Tazara, but again was
interrupted by the unsettled conditions and loss of trained personnel in
Mozambique. Thus much of the traffic was shifted to South African ports
and destinations. This is regarded as temporary— but may last for a period
of years
.
The traffic density is about 1,950,000 net ton miles per mile of line,
despite the considerable mileage of currently light traffic lines.
As shown in table 3» "the revenue has of course increased sharply in
dollar terms over the years; there has, however, been an increase in real
terms as .well, as the greater tonnage suggests; between 1972 and 1982 the
increase in real terms was
The Ability to Handle the Available Traffic
During the period of UDI, the railroad suffered serious problems of
shortages of spare parts and inability to obtain new equipment. It was
particularly short of locomotives and was forced to borrow substantial
numbers from South Africa. Thus it almost voluntarily surrendered considerable
traffic to road transport. By now, however, the railroad is functioning
normally and efficiently again, and is seeking additional traffic, especially
in bulk commodities which it can handle cheaply. It is not easy, however,
to recover the traffic from road transport, particularly given the nature
of the tariffs, as noted below. The system has suffered somewhat from loss
of trained personnel. The number of whites, the most highly trained, has
Li.'
Table 3
Financial Results, National Railways of Zimbabwe, 1968-1982
Years ending June 30 1 except 1982
Year Operating Operating Operating Operating Net Surplus
Revenue Expenses Surplus Ratio or Deficit
Z$0C0s ZJOOOs Z$000s Z$OOOs
1968 52,586 40,651 11,935 77 - 2,130
1969 57,^01 38,162 19,239 66 + 2,989
1970 61,359 41,727 19,632 68 + 1,678
1971 61,280 43,900 17,380 72 - 1,676
1972 65,776 46,624 19,152 71 - 1,926
1973 63,692 51,437 12,255 81 -10,996
1974 63,003 56,664 6,339 90 -19,139
1975 71 , 666 63,183 8,483 88 -21,226
1976 78,754 72,736 6,018 92 -29,119
1977 83,273 82,171 1,102 99 -36,912
1978 81
,
322 80
,
772 550 99 -35,697
1979 102,341 89,400 13,441 87 -28,965
1980 128,244 115,130 13,114 90 -32,151
1931 153,969 133,692 20,277 87 -32,681
1982* 157,882 139,287 18,595 88 -34,947
* through May 31
Source: Zimbabwe, Monthly Digest of Statistics , August 1982, table 17.1.
fallen from 8000 to 35C0 over recent years, and training of Africans has not
been adequate to offset this loss.
The railroad does operate some road transport, mainly to reach points
not served by the rail lines, stressing hulk commodities, which the
independent road transport firms do not particularly want.
The Rate Structure
The rate structure is still one typical of rail tariffs of the past.
There are 14 rate classes, plus a tank car rate. The first 10 class rates
are expressed in units of 100 kg, commodities grouped according to loading
characteristics and value. The high value, low density commodities, particu-
larly luxury goods, receive the highest rates; machinery and groceries and
other less valuable items, the intermediate; building materials, for example,
the lower. Glasses 11-14 consist of the bulk commodities, the rates shown
per 1000 kg, such as coal, minerals, and agricultural products, with low
rates. Export shipments receive lower than normal rates. Shipments under
100 kg (about 220 pounds) move at a flat rate, irrespective of distance.
This is the type of tariff that, throughout the world, has resulted in
loss of high value traffic to road transport, and clearly this is occurring
in Zimbabwe. On the other hand, it concentrates on the railways the com-
modities they can most efficiently handle—but makes the covering of cost
more difficult.
Losses . As shown in table J, the railroad has consistently shown an
operating surplus although less in real terms than in the early seventies.
But not since 1971 has this been sufficient to cover depreciation and interest
costs, and for the 1982 entire year the deficit is about $42 million (at current
exchange rates about U.S. $45 million). Losses in the last few years have
been aggravated by the rise in petroleum prices, very sharp increases in
wages following independence, and governmental action in eliminating
payments for car use due from Mozambique. The enterprise is of course a
government statutory corporation, and the deficit is financed out of tax
revenue. While there is hope that the deficit can be reduced materially
as business activity in the country revives, elimination of the deficit
is not seen as feasible in the foreseeable future; it is regarded as
necessary for maintenance of an efficient railroad system essential for
economic development. Nearly $600 million investment is planned for the
railways in the next five years.
The operating cost per ton km is about 20 (Z) or 3.30 per ton mile, (slightly
higher in equivalent US cents), the total cost about 3# per ton km, or 4.80
per ton mile. These are comparable to those of other relatively efficient
rail systems. There are 20,000 employees.
PART II. ZAMBIA AND TANZANIA
Because Zambia and Tanzania share one major rail line, Tazara, the
two countries will be discussed in a single section. The principal carrier
in Zambia is Zambia Railways, in Tanzania, Tanzania Railways Corporation.
About half of Tazara is in each country.
ZAMBIA RAILWAYS
Detailed data on Zambia Railways have not been assembled, but a brief
summary is included because of the interrelationship of the railways of the
country with those of Zimbabwe and Tanzania.
Much of Zambia has never had rail service. The Zambia Railways line
was built by Rhodesian Railways, crossing the Zambesi at Victoria Falls in
1903, reaching Kabwe (then Broken Hill) in 1906, the Copper Belt (then little
-13a-
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developed) in 1909. Commercial agriculture and trade and industrial activity
concentrated along the "line of rail"; the geographical pattern of economic
development was influenced "by the railway perhaps more than in any other country.
The main line extends roughly 1000 km northerly from the river crossing to
the Copper Belt, connecting with Tazara at Kapiri Mposhi and with the Zaire
rail system at the border. Apart from branches in the Copper Belt, the only
other branch reaches the coal mines at Naamba. The line from Livingstone
to Mulobezi, serving the sawmill, is operated by Zambia Railways for the
government. Fig. 2 shows the line and those of neighboring countries.
While there is considerable in-country traffic, in coal, maize, and other
goods, much of the traffic is to or from the ports. Table 4 shows the changing
patterns of the handling of import and export traffic. Originally most was
channeled through Rhodesia and virtually all was rail. A portion, particularly
import traffic, went via the Benguela Railway to the Atlantic port of Lobito.
With UDI in Rhodesia and eventual closing of the border, a substantial portion
was shifted to Dar es Salaam, first by road, then with the completion of
Tazara, primarily by rail. After 1976 the Lobito route—the best in many
ways for merchandise imports—was closed by unsettled conditions in Angola
and is not yet functioning in 1983 • But with independence in Zimbabwe, use
of the southern route resumed
—
particularly because of problems with Tazara
and the Port of Dar es Salaam. Thus in the last two years, while Tazara handles
the bulk of the export traffic, the import traffic is divided about equally
between the Dar route and that via Zimbabwe. The use of Tazara is of course
disadvantageous to Zambia Railways on the Copper Belt traffic, since it has
only a very small portion of the total haul. There is considerable road
transport competition, with increasing amounts on the southern routes. For
traffic between Harare and Lusaka and the Copper Belt, the road mileage is
-15-
Table -
Percentage of Zambia Import and export Traffic via Various Routes
Selected Years 1953-1981
xports
1953 1963 1967 1972 1973 1975 1976 1979 1980 1981
Lobito-Zaire (rail) 23 20 5^ 40 15 7 6 4
Dar es Salaam vroad and rail) • 31 26 35 51 lb 52 59 66
Malawi (road) 8 1 5 9 5 2 • 5 --
Mozambique (road) 1 4
Zimbabwe (rail and road) 100 100 34 54 1 38 34 29
Kazangula (road) neg
Kenya (road) 6 neg 1
Air freight 5 neg 1 • 5 .6
Lobito-Zaire (rail)
Dar es Salaam ( road and rail)
Malawi (road)
Mozambique (road)
Zimbabwe (rail and road)
Kazangula (road)
Kenya (road)
Air freight
Imports
11 49 29 neg neg neg
19 23 43 76 47 47 46
13 13 9 * .4 .5
— 0038302
— 66 4 44 51 50
neg 15 1 .2 neg
--O833OOO1323322
Traffic on the Dar es Salaam route was all road until 1975i about equal rail and road
1976 and predominantly rail since.
The Mozambique figure does not include traffic via Zimbabwe to Mozambique ports.
Source: Annual Reports . Bank of Zambia.
substantially less than the rail mileage. The inability of the railway to
handle all the traffic available, particularly in maize, has of course increased
the relative importance of road transport. Nevertheless rail remains the
dominant form of transport. Unlike the Zimbabwe situation, much road transport
is handled by two large parastatals, Zambia-Tanzania Road Service and Contract
Haulage.
Table 5 shows the relative division of import and export traffic between
road and rail in the last three years.
The railway handles substantial transit traffic between Zaire and the
countries to the south, copper for export via South Africa, and maize from
Zimbabwe and South Africa. This traffic continued during the period in which
Zambia closed the border with Rhodesia to its own trade.
Two passenger trains a day are operated on the line, from the Copper
Belt through Lusaka to Livingstone; the schedules are shown in Fig. J.
The railway has had difficulties in handling the available freight
traffic ever since its formation from Rhodesian Railways, despite substantial
Canadian management and training assistance at times and three World Bank
loans. The track and signalling systems are superior to those of most
tropical African countries. The major problem has been inadequate trained
staff and shortages of locomotives and freight cars. The entire system is
dieselized; but maintenance has not been adequate, and exchange problems have
created the usual parts shortages. There has been a constant shortage of
freight cars; the railway in part blames this on Tazara, on which turnaround
time has been very slow, and at times numbers of cars have been locked in
Angola. On the other hand the system has far more South African Railways
cars, some 2^00, than the agreed upon limit of 1648.
There has been some improvement in 1982, and the traffic does move, but
the line is not operated to its potential capacity.
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Table 5
Foreign Trade by Mode of Transportation
(metric tons) 1979-1981
19^9 196C 1981 (a)
Total Trade Percent Total Trade Percent Total Trade Percent
Road 364,62? 2&.7 447,03? 26.3 305,499 21.9
Hail 1,090,320 ?4.1 1,200,720 '71.9 1,070,909 76.9
Airfreight 12,010 1.2 23,1^3 1.3 16,503 1.2
TOTAL 1,471,957 100.0 1,670,900 100.0 1,392,911 100.0
Source: Bank of Zambia Annual Report 1981.
Including lube oil
.
Despite its operational difficulties, Zambia Railways has managed to
show an operating surplus, including depreciation in cost, except in 1975
and 1981. The 1981 loss, of K 1.9 million, was due to the inability to
raise rates sufficiently to offset higher costs. Rate changes require
government approval, even though the railway is a statutory corporation.
But interest costs are not covered.
There have been long standing plans for additional railroad construction
in the country, particularly to connect with the Malawi system west of
Lilongwe and with the Mozambique system at Tete. Currently the Malawi line
is being extended to the border, and, as indicated in Fig. 4, Zambia is
building from the border to Ghipata, one of the major cities in the country
without rail service. But a long gap will remain to connect this with the
Zambia network.
19-
Fig. k
ZAMBIA
RAILWAYS
CHIPATA-MCHINJI RAIL LINE
CONSTRUCTION PROJECT
This general information is for ail those who can supply crushed-
stone ballast to Zambia Railways for use in the new railway line
under construction from the Malawi-Zambia border to Chipata.
The requirement Is of 50mm size approximately 20,000 cubic
metres for the use in the track*Additional stone will be required
for building activities by local contractors. The requirement is at
a specified point at Chipata and the supply Is to be completed
within 12 months from January 1983. All those who can supply
this type of crushed stone may register their names, with the
undersigned giving particulars of their plant and machinery In
their possession or on order past experience etc, before 14th
November 1982. - '^^^^IS^^t-V^^- T - ^ - -
Chtaf Civil Engineer §
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TAZARA
Tazara consists of one line extending 1,885 km (1,158 miles) from a
connection with Zambia Railways at Xapiri Mposhi to the harbour at Dar es
Salaam, with 1.06? m. guage. It serves Mbeya, one of the major cities in
Tanzania not previously served by rail, but not Iringa, the other major
city in southwest Tanzania; much of the area served is relatively undeveloped.
To date the line has handled primarily Zambia traffic, copper outbound,
fertilizer, grain, and manufactured goods inbound. The line, built by
Mainland China and completed in 1975. was one of the major rail construction
projects in the world in the last half century, and freed Zambia of dependence
on the southern route. But in terms of performance it has been a disappointment.
It has handled a substantial volume of traffic more cheaply than road trans-
port, but not to the extent anticipated. It is difficult to get adequate
scientific explanations of the problems. Some of the track was not well
located in terms of water runoff. The basic trouble appears to be inadequate
trained personnel, particularly for management and equipment maintenance.
It has been constantly short of locomotives, which have not been maintained
well. They are diesel hydraulic, rather than diesel electric, and neighboring
roads cannot assist. Train delays have been serious, with a very slow turn-
around time, tieing up its own and Zambia Railways freight cars. Part of
the trouble has arisen from congestion in the port of Dar es Salaam and
the delays in clearing Zambia bound traffic because of lack of foreign exchange.
The line has been so short of personnel and equipment that at times it has
suspended passenger service entirely; currently it is running this service
only once a week. The line has great potential, and will be of growing
importance for Central Africa. But currently it has a long ways to go for
efficient operation.
The line has about 2200 freight cars and 100 liesel locomotives, with
a staff of about 10,000. In recent years it has averaged about 1 million
tons of freight (900 million ton kilometers), about 495 > 000 ton km/km or
the same ton miles per mile. This not a heavy volume of traffic. It carries
about 1.3 million passengers a year.
The tariff structure is the old value of service type, adapted in part
because much of the traffic is not vulnerable to road transport competition.
The copper traffic allocation is controlled by the government of Zambia.
Commodities are classified into 11 categories, the bulk agricultural commodities
falling into the 11th class (lowest rate) . The rates taper substantially
but not to the extent found in many countries. The scale of rates as of
1981 is shown in table 6 in Tanzania shillings. Copper, in scale 6, bears a
relatively high rate, about 5 US cents per ton mile.
Table 6
Tazara Freight Rates (TShs/ton)
Scale 100 km 200 km 500 km 1000 km 1500 km
1 189 272 417 637 857
2 168 231 361 566 771
3 152 199 316 505 694
4 136 178 293 458 620
5 121 162 259 411 562
6 110 151 235 360 486
7 100 139 220 343 463
8 89 124 195 310 423
9 79 112 176 280 386
10 73 104 167 265 383
11 37 65 143 261 376
Passenger fares are based on a straight mileage basis, class 1, 30t«i
per km; 2, 16.5 tc, 3, 7.5 tc. The second and third class rates are about
25% greater than those of Tanzania Railways.
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TANZANIA RAILWAYS
The principal railway system of the country is that of Tanzania
Railways (TRC) , with 2800 km of meter gauge track, and 16,000 employees.
Lines
There are two distinct lines, with a connecting link between them
(Figure 5). The principal portions of both were built by the German
colonial administration prior -to World War I.
1. The Tanzania Central line, extending from Dar es Salaam west-
ward via Morogoro, Dodoma and Tabora to Kigoma on Lake
Tanganyika, completed in 1914, 1,255 kilometers. This is by
far the heaviest traffic line. There are three branches:
(a) Tabora-Mwanza , on Lake Victoria, 379 km, started in 1914-15,
completed in 1928, also a heavy volume route.
(b) Tabora south to Mpanda, 213 km, built in 1947.
(c) Kigoma south to Mikumi (1958) and on to Kidatu (1965)
where it almost touches Tazara, 108 km.
2. The Tanga line, 437 km, begun in 1895 (thus the oldest in the
country), reaching Moshi in 1911, extended to Arusha in 1929.
These are connected by the Link line, Ruvu to Mruazi, built in 1963,
188 km. Before that time the lines were not connected.
There is an unused segment, 31 km, between the Tanga line and the
Kenya border, cut with the closing of the border. This line, if oper-
ating, would allow through service from Nairobi to Dar es Salaam.
Two lines have been abandoned: an extensive network in the south
extending inward from Mtwara, built as a part of the ground nut scheme
and abandoned following the collapse of the scheme, and a line to
Fig. 5
Kigoma
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Source: GIDA, Tanzania Railway Transport Sector Study .
Kinyangari in the Singida district, abandoned after less than 20 years
because it generated so little traffic.
Management of the system was united with the Kenya-Uganda lines in
1948, to form East African Railways, but this was dissolved in 1975,
following the breakup of the East African Community.
An intensive study of the system has recently been completed by the
Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA).
The Physical Plant
In general, the physical plant is in fair condition and traffic does
move; derailments have increased somewhat but are not frequent. But,
as noted subsequently, there are serious limitations which make it im-
possible to move all available traffic.
Rail: The largest segment of track has had 60 pound' rail, the cen-
tral line to milepost 310, the Mwanza branch and the line from Tanga to
Moshi. The remainder of the main line is 56 pound rail—the original
rail laid by the Germans 1908-1914, with the original steel sleepers.
The portions from Moshi to Arusha and the Mpanda branch have 45 and 50
pound rail, as does part of the link line. These are the three weak
segments, not capable of handling the larger diesels, a problem of par-
ticular seriousness on the link line. The rail is in surprisingly good
condition, though a third is over 70 years old, but some is worn. The
CIDA study recommends the installation of 80 pound rail on the entire
main line and 60 pound rail on the others, to allow freight train speeds
up to 45 MPH. A portion of the main line has already been changed.
Tanzania Railway Transport Study , 12 vol., Dar es Salaam and
Ottawa, May 1981. This section is based primarily on the CIDA report
and discussions with CIDA personnel.
Most lines have gravel ballast (Mpanda is an exception) but it is in had
shape in raany areas. The link line is particularly troublesome because
it runs through swampy areas.
There are typically 2,240 ties (sleepers) per mile, primarily steel.
Consideration is being given to concrete ties, which lessen the drain
on foreign exchange; they are satisfactory if rails are welded and the
joints staggered.
The maximum grade is 2.2% against westbound traffic, between Dar es
Salaam and Morogoro, unfortunately the heaviest traffic portion of the
line. The sharpest curve is 8°. One portion of the line in the far
west is subject to flooding.
Locomotives : As of mid 1982, the line has 116 diesels, of 9 differ-
ent types, from Germany, the U.K., India, and Canada. The newest and
largest are MLW built (Canada). The diesels are as follows:
Class HP Number
35
8
15
2
24
Other 320 or less 32
The line still has a number of steam locomotives, reported as 63
in 1979. These were being used in some line service as late as 1980;
currently they are used only for switching, in Morogoro, Tabora, and a
few other locations. Most are in a bad state of repair. The present
plan is to phase them out as soon as possible, but there is some thought
of keeping and rebuilding the best ones. They are oil burners, and
88 2050
87 1840
73 1380
72 1240
64 760
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thera would be little gaii in keeping them unless they were converted
Co coal.
Tyoically one diesel is used on a freight train, 23 cars (1,350 tons)
being the train length limit up to Morogoro, as the couplers will not
stand longer trains. But two diesels are frequently used to Morogoro
and sometimes beyond. Ml trains on the main line change engines in
Morogoro, location of the diesel shops, and Tabora. The Morogoro
shops are new and not fully operative, mostly for lack of personnel.
The diesel repair shops of East African Railways were located in Nairobi;
when the system split up, TRC was left without such facilities until
the new shops were built.
Typically about 60% of the road engines and 51% of the switchers
are available for service, a very low figure by comparison with most
railroads, due to lack of trained personnel and spare parts.
Freight Cars : The line has some 3,800 freight cars (wagons); 300
of these are the old, short, two axle cars. About 70 percent of all
cars are in good or excellent condition. The cars are air brake equipped,
but the couplers are not automatic. Typical capacity is 33 to 38 tons.
The use of automatic couplers would allow longer trains, but the CIDA
study concludes that the change would not be economic. Average turn-
around time for freight cars is 21 days.
The line has a total of 165 passenger cars, over 30% of which are
more than 30 years old. There are not nearly enough cars to handle
the number of persons seeking to travel. A total of 110 cars are on
order; a number from Sweden were delivered late in 1982.
Containerization : While there is no piggyback operation the use
of containers has been growing. They are particularly important for
the cross lake transit traffic, simplifying the loading and unloading.
They are also used extensively for up country construction materials,
and for export of tobacco.
Standard flat cars are still used for the containers.
Operation
Freight trains are typically operated with a crew of 2, passenger
trains, 3. Trains are limited to 35 mph speed, but with many 10 mph
slow orders. On most of the system a token technique is used to con-
trol train movements. When a train enters a segment of line, the engi-
neer receives a metal token from a mechanism connected to the next
station by wire; when he has done so, the token at the next station
cannot be removed until the train has cleared. This is a virtually fool
proof system to avoid train collisions, but does not function when the
wire communications are not operating. There is no signal system; con-
trol is entirely through the stations. The only exception to the use
of the tokens is on the lines from Tabora to Kigoraa and Mpanda, operated
with a paper train order system.
Passenger service is operated daily on the two main lines. On the
central line, the train leaves I)ar es Salaam at 7 p.m., arrives in
Dodoraa the next morning, Tabora in the evening, and Kigoraa and Mwanza
the next morning, averaging about 20 mph. Three classes of service are
provided and reservations are required. Daily service is operated from
Dar to Moshi, but not to Arusha.
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Figure %. A Typical Railroad Station Scene in Tanzania—Tabora
TfT.rraars™
Source: GIDA, Tanzania Railway Project Study.
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In 1979, passenger train on time performance was 27%, but the
present figure is reported to be better.
Non-rail Operation
TRC operates vessels on Lakes Victoria and Tanganyika, including a
42-car ferry from Mwanza to Bukoba and Musoma, which do not have direct
rail service. Only the old Lieraba, a passenger vessel, is operated by
TRC on Lake Tanganyika, but private carriers provide service across the
lake.
The system operates road transport service from Dar es Salaam to
Iringa and Mbeya, Iringa to Moshi, and Mwanza to Bukoba. Luxury bus
service is operated to Iringa and Mbeya, but most regular bus service
is provided by private firms.
Freight Rates
The East African Railway tariff was of the traditional value of
service type with low rates on farm products and export traffic. After
TRC was formed, a completely new tariff was developed, based strictly
on cost of handling differences. There are only four classes of com-
modities, based on loading characteristics: LCL, 2: 10 ton loads,
3: 25 ton loads, 4: 30 tons and over. Rates taper with distance but not
to the extent in the U.S. Typical rates are as shown below, together
with rates per ton/km and a comparison with Tazara rates. On the more
valuable commodities, TRC rates are much less; on less valuable com-
modity, shorter distance shipments, the rates are higher. In general,
as the table indicates, TRC rates are lower than those of Tazara
(Table 8).
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The rate per ton/km falls roughly in half between 100 and 1000 km.
Table 7
Tanzania Railway Rates 1981
TRC General Goods Rates (TShs/ton except containers)
Scale 100 km 200 km 500 km 1000 km 1500 km
1 126 144 211 389 567
2 89 103 186 289 389
3 53 89 161 • 248 348
4 45 85 14 2 228 329
Livestock 55 67 103 165 226
Petrol 36 70 143 286 435
Containers* 980 1200 1850 3100 4500
*Total charge.
TRC General Goods Rates (Tshs/ ton-km)
Scale 100 km 200 km 500 km 1000 km 1500 km
1 1.26 .72 .42 .39 .38
2 .89 .52 .37 .29 .26
3 .53 .45 .32 .25 .23
4 .45 .43 .28 .23 .22
Table 8
Comparison of Typical Tazara and TRC Rates
100 km 200 km 500 km 100 km
TAZARA TRC TAZARA TRC TAZARA TRC TAZARA TRC
Copper 100 45 151 85 235 142 360 228
Coffee 89 45 124 85 195 142 310 228
Sugar 73 45 104 85 167 142 265 228
Cement 37 45 65 85 143 142 261 228
Cotton 37 45 65 85 143 142 261 228
Fertilizer 37 45 65 85 143 142 261 228
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One consequence of the cost-based tariff is that the rate as a per-
centage of the selling prices of the goods is very low on valuable goods;
examples, for typical distances, include 1% on coffee and 2% on petro-
leum products, vs. 14% on sorghum and 23% on cement. This type of
tariff lessens the danger of loss of traffic to motor transport, and is
basically economically justified but it does sacrifice potential
revenue on the high value commodities, so long as they stay on rail.
In general, rail rates are lower than truck rates for distances over
150 to 200 km. Typical figures are as follows:
Rate Ts per ton
Distance (km) Rail Truck
Dar es Salaam - Morogoro 203 90 150
Dar es Salaam - Arusha 637 165 350
Dar es Salaam - Mwanza 12 29 276 1500
The CIDA study concludes that truck costs are from 3 to 7 times the
rail costs except on the shorter hauls. But truck time is much faster;
for example, on a long haul, 4 days (despite poor roads) vs. as much as
30 days. CIDA studies conclude that even with adjustments for time
differences, rail is still typically cheaper, but of course less so.
Traffic Flows
As shown in Figure 5, the main line from Dar es Salaam (where 50%
of the traffic originates) to Tabora has the heaviest flow, with the
Morogoro-Ruvu (junction point for the link line) portion the heaviest
segment on that line. Beyond Tabora, the Mwanza line has somewhat heavier
CIDA study of truck costs shows that with 80% capacity use, costs
are .65Ts per t/km with paved roads, .91 with earth roads.
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traffic Chan the Tabora line. The link and Tanga lines have much lighter
traffic, under 100,000 ton km per km, and the other two branches under
50,000. By comparison with other systems, even the 500,000 main line
figure is not heavy.
\ few major traffic flows can be noted briefly. Petroleum and
cement move on all lines; all petroleum moves by rail beyond Morogoro
in rail territory with minor exceptions; grain, Dodoma to Dar es Salaam
(Dar); sugar, Kigoraa to Dar; coffee, from Moshi to Tanga and Dar;
livestock from Tabora to Dar; cotton and cattle cake, Mwanza to Dar;
fertilizer, Dar to Tabora, and on the Tanga line; sisal, Morogoro to
Dar and Moshi to Tanga. Taffic is well balanced, but 20% consists of
petroleum and cattle, requiring equipment in which return loads cannot
be handled.
In a sample month (June 1978)
,
petroleum yielded 16% of total freight
revenue and grain 10%; there was then a sharp drop to 7 for cement, 6
for coffee, 4 for livestock, 4 for tobacco. No other product exceeded
1%
—though general miscellaneous freight, which includes most manu-
factured goods yields 46%.
Major truck routes are those between Dar, Iringa and Mbeya, and Dar
and Tanga to Arusha. There is little effective truck competition to the
western portion of the central line, as there are virtually no roads.
Passenger Fares and Traffic
Passenger fares are based on a straight distance basis: .29 Ts per
km first class; .13, second; .07, third; and .05 on long distances. Thus
a 500 km third class ticket costs 30 Ts or about $US3 at current exchange
rates. Comparable fares for typical points are as follows (in Tanzania
shillings)
.
Rai.1
1st 3rd bus air
Dar es Salaam to
Morogoro 60 14 22 na
Tabora 250 85 121 665
Arusha 18 7 37 73 490
Mwanza 360 69 148 740
Thus third class rail is the cheapest, bus being about the same as
second class rail. First class is about 6 times third class, and air
about 2 1/2 times first class rail, and from 8 to 12 times third class
rail. The problem is that reservations on rail are difficult to get,
often requiring a month in advance. The unreserved third class cars
on the secondary mixed train are very crowded.
Passenger traffic, which yields 18% of total revenue, a compara-
tively high figure, is heaviest on the Dodoma-Tabora portion.
The Decline in Traffic Volume
While detailed figures year by year are not available, it is clear
that the total volume of freight and passenger traffic has declined, by
about 7% a year, since 1972. In that year, total tons of freight carried
was 1,680 million; in 1979 it was 850,000, and the 1982 figure is still
lower. Passengers carried in 1972 were 4.2 million, in 1979 1.8 million.
The railroad is estimated by CIDA to handle about 43% of the total freight
transport, compared to 54% by road and 3% by water. Rail handles about
32% of passenger travel. While some of the loss may be due to the clos-
ing of the border with Kenya, most of the decline is from all indications
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the product of one cause: the inability of the railway to handle all the
traffic available.
The CIDA study concludes that the railway handles only 43% of the
traffic available to it. The following percentages show the portion of
the total traffic that trucks have obtained simply because of inability
of the railroad to move it: petroleum products, 50; cement, 64; grain,
72; sugar, 83; coffee, 24; fertilizer, 70. The result is a substantial
loss to the economy in the form of higher costs estimated to be Ts 220
million in 1979, and heavier drain on foreign exchange.
Revenue and Earnings
It is impossible to carry revenue information back beyond 1975 and
the figures since that date are not entirely accurate. But Table 9
gives a- picture of the general trends.
Table 9
Financial Statistics, Tanzania Railways, 1975-79
millions of Tanzanian shillings
Category 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
Revenues
Operating Expenses
Operating Margin
Depreciation
Interest
Net Earnings
Thus revenue has increased despite the loss of traffic because of
higher rates, but has fallen in real terras. The line showed a net
profit in 1975 and 1976, deficits in the next three years, but an oper-
ating profit (not including depreciation) in all years except 1978.
290.7 329.6 336.5 323.2 360.3
206.4 183.7 322.7 336.0 297.2
84.3 145.9 13.8 -12.8 63.1
35.0 35.0 35.0 33.3 60.8
30.0 30.0 30.0 11.6 28.4
19.3 80.9 -51.2 -57.7 -25.3
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Apparantly 19S2 will show .a slight profit. Thus the Financial picture
is not different from those of most African lines. The problem, as
noted, has been the inability to handle more than half the traffic
available, resulting in use of much more expensive road transport,
greater foreign exchange drain, further destruction of roads, shortages
of goods up country, inability to move out export crops, ^oad trans-
port itself has had many problems centering around shortages of fuel,
parts, and bad roads—and thus a considerable portion of the traffic
that the railroad cannot handle simply does not move at all.
TORSPEEI*
AND
RELIABILITY
APPIYFOR A WAGON NOW!
Dtatrict Traffic Manager,
Sox 9040 DSM—Tel. 23922
Box 95 Tanga—Td. 3125
Boa 91 Tabora-*Td. 2047
Box 875 Mwanza—Td. 20256V
Figure 6
This advertisement is hardly
consistent with the inability
of the railway to move the
traffic
.
From Tanzania Daily News
,
November 1982.
Causes of the Problems
The basic situation is one of serious underutilization of the line.
Old as the track is, it is not in hopeless condition. While it is im-
possible to measure the relative effects of various difficulties, the
CIDA report and discussions with CIDA personnel suggest the following
sources of the problems:
1. Communications. Perhaps the most serious trouble is bad
communications, within the yards and between stations and
trains, with no good central traffic control. It is diffi-
cult for personnel in the major yards to communicate with
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one another, and no one knows exactly where trains are.
The token system is almost proof for preventing collisions,
but it slows down service, particularly when something goes
wrong with the communications lines connecting the stations.
It is surprising that the passenger trains are able to run
on time as well as they do.
2. poor ballast. Most of the system has rock ballast, but it
has deteriorated seriously. This is the prime cause of
slow orders, thus resulting in substantial lapsed time,
adding to cost and poor service.
3. Congestion at Kigoraa and Mwanza, resulting in serious de-
lays and poor utilization of equipment. The problem arises
with the translake traffic, to Bukoba and Musoraa in
Tanzania, and to Uganda, Burundi, Rwanda, and Zaire. While
Uganda traditionally shipped through Kenya, with which it
has direct rail connections, political considerations since
the overthrow of Amin have increased preference for shipping
via Tanzania. The transit traffic across the lake to the
other countries has long been important; the Zaire railways
do not extend directly to the Atlantic ports, the route via
the Benguela Railway to Lobito has not functioned in several
years, and the route to the south is long and costly.
The difficulty is that the ships on the lakes and the
transshipment facilities are hopelessly inadequate. Only
one vessel can handle freight cars. There is no "bridge"
at Bukoba for running the freight cars off the ship (there
is at Musoraa, one of the few cities in the world that has
railroad tracks but no rail connection to the outside world).
The remainder of the freight has Co be unloaded from the rail
cars and transferred to ships; this is a very slow and
laborious process, particularly because the ships are old and
careful balancing of cargo is necessary. The system never
catches up—on any day there may be 400 cars bottled up in the
yards at Mwanza. To prevent hopeless congestion many cars are
held at Tabora until there is space at the two ports. The re-
sult is to delay greatly the shipments to cross lake ports
and to aggravate the shortages of freight cars for all pur-
poses. There is some belief that if the system acquires more
freight cars they will simply end up in the jam at the lake
ports
.
4. Lack of adequate equipment maintenance facilities. This has
been a serious handicap in past years for both diesels and
freight cars. The completion of the new facilities at Morogoro
should help this work materially—although this was not the
ideal location for the shops and trained personnel are not yet
available.
5. The problem, common in all African countries, of lack of trained
manpower, in management and many aspects of operation, including
equipment maintenance. Thus overall control of the system has
been inadequate, as well as some specific aspects of work.
6. Shortage of freight cars, aggravated by the slow orders and
the port congestion.
7. Shortage of spare parts resulting from lack of foreign exchange.
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Proposed Changes
The CIHA. st:idv and similar work by SIDA, the Swedish aid organi-
zation, on Che Tanga line, offer a number of priority proposals, in some
of which the aid organizations have provided assistance.
1. Specifically, CIDA proposes, for the central line, an invest-
ment of $US 780 million over the next 20 years, of which, in
millions, $280 would go for freight cars, S92 for locomotives,
375 for passenger cars, and $140 for track improvement. The
estimated rate of return is 15%. More specifically, major
proposals include the following:
(a) Major track restoration, including the replacement of
all rail on the central line by 80 pount rail, replace-
ment of light rail by 60 pound rail on other lines,
new sleepers, and complete reballasting.
(b) Improvement of communications, with stress on microwave,
to facilitate train movements and control over equipment.
(c) A series of steps to end the congestion at the lake ports,
including ultimately, additional car ferries.
(d) Improved training facilities generally.
(e) Additional locomotives, freight cars, and passenger cars,
as noted above.
(f) Additional repair facilities.
(g) Experimentation with concrete sleepers.
(h) General improvement of control facilities to improve
car and locomotive utilization.
(i) Priority importation of spare parts.
(j) Higher rate.
Longer range considerations include possible conversion of gauge
to the 1.067 meter gauge of the other southern and central
African lines. It is impossible to lay a third rail as only
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2 5/3 inches would separate Che two. Thus the change would
have to be made all at once. The change would allow interchange
of equipment with Tazara and with the lines in Zaire (although
Tazara couplers are different) , but would make it impossible to
restore interchange with the Kenya-Uganda lines unless they
change as well. Cost is estimated at about S85 million.
2. Consideration of building a new line from Arusha to Musoma, thus
lessening pressure on the cross lake transfer and increasing
potential service to Uganda.
Canada has provided substantial assistance, with management and
technical advice and training and financing of equipment and track im-
provement. Sweden has aided on the Tanga line.
Government Policy
The government of Tanzania, in its recent Structural Adjustment
Program
,
designed to move country out of its economic malaise, stresses
improvements to the railway. A key element in the program is to maxi-
mize use of the railways in order to lessen the use of more expensive
road transport and foreign exchange drain, thus planning for rehabilita-
tion of the railway and an attempt to make greater use of Tazara. A
2Ministry of Agriculture report, National Food Summary
,
concludes "The
railway represents the cheapest means of transport but the total haulage
is way below the potential. Both Tazara and Tanzania Railways are in
Tanzania, Ministry of Planning and Economic Affairs, Structural
Adjustment Program for Tanzania
,
Dar es Salaam, June 1982, pp. 28-31.
Tanzania, Ministry of Agriculture, National Foods Survey
,
Dar es
Salaam, May 1982, p. 19.
""
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urgerit need of rehabilitation." Among specific suggestions is one to
shift fertilizer transport from road to rail.
PART III
SUDAN
The Sudan Railways constitutes the largest rail system in Tropical
Africa, with 4,756 km (almost 3,000 miles) of line. Except for the
Southern Region, which is reached only marginally at Wau, the settled
areas of the country are well served. figure 7 shows the lines, Table
10 the lines and the dates of completion. The first line, built south
from Wadi Haifa along the Nile as a part of the military expedition to
rescue General Gordon, was ultimately abandoned in 1905. The new direct
line reached Khartoum in 1399. The final line, to Wau, was completed
only in 1961. The system, unlike the others in the study, is isolated
from those of other countries and thus there is no rail transit traffic
or exchange of cars. Only a short gap once separated the Sudan and the
Eritrean systems, but the latter is not now functioning. The gauge,
1.067 m., is the same as that of southern Africa but not of Kenya and
Uganda. The railway is a statutory corporation, wholly owned by the
1
government.
The Physical Plant
The physical plant, once one of the best in Tropical Africa, has
deteriorated substantially over the last two decades. There are
Excellent current data on transport in Sudan are provided by the
annual Transport Statistical Bulletin , issued by the Sudan Ministry of
Finance and Economic Planning.
39a-
Fig. 7 Sudan Railway Lines
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inherent problems of flash floods, lack of water in many areas, desert
sand, and very long distances with little or no population, but as
noted below there have been other problems as well.
Rail. Table 10 indicates rail weight. The main line from Port
Sudan via Athara to Khartoum has 90 lb. rail, which is being extended
to Sennar. This is an adequate weight. The secondary main lines
—
Khartoum to El Obeid, Haifa to Sennar, and Atbara to #10 Junction have
75 lb. rail; the remainder, 50. Most of the rail on the western lines
is 50 lb. relay rail taken from the main line as it was upgraded. Much
of the light rail dates back to 1910 and some to the turn of the cen-
tury. Some of the rail is worn, but it is not on the whole in bad
shape, though the 50 lb. rail is too light for many of the diesels.
Most sleepers are creosoted wood, unlike the countries to the south
that use steel or concrete. Some sleepers are produced in the country,
but many are imported, especially from Malaysia; all must go to Atbara
for creosoting. The life is estimated from 15 to 25 years. Many of
the existing sleepers are termite eaten, and the telephone poles are
particularly vulnerable to termites. No serious consideration has been
given to other than wood sleepers.
The ballast is poor; some is rock, but a substantial amount is dirt.
The ballast has been neglected over recent years, and the poor condition
results in slow orders, derailments, and rail wear. A five mile seg-
ment on the Haifa Port Sudan main line has been a particular source of
derailment. For another example, in the last year in the west, the
"Stations" on the line through the desert to Wadi Haifa have
numbers rather than names.
-41-
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nunber of derailments per month between el Rahad and Babanousa was 9,
Babanousa-Wau, 2, Babanousa-Nyala, 2.
Control. Traffic control is based on the same token system as in
Tanzania and with results that are even worse because of the very poor
communications systems, depending on wires that frequently are not
functioning.
Locomotives. As of 1982 there were reported to be 254 line engines
and 86 switchers. But of the 254, 96 are steam, and these are now used
only for switching. Only 140 of the 254 line locomotives are actually
operable, or 55%, and 66% of the switchers. The system has a great
variety of diesels from various countries—an added source of mainten-
ance difficulty.
The freight car (freight wagon) fleet is the most extensive in
tropical Africa north of Zimbabwe, a total of 6,264, the majority of
which will handle 30 to 40 tons. The reported number of passenger
coaches was 1,177, but the number potentially available for passenger
service was 531 and a large number of these were not usable. About
half of the total were third class cars.
Operations . Table 10 provides information on frequency of freight
train service, which ranges from 3 each way daily on the main line to 1
each way about each third day on the line to Wau. Passenger service
varies from twice a day Khartoum-Atbara to 6 days a week Khartoum-El
Obeid, on alternate days on most other lines, down to once a week to
Wau. Passenger trains average about 32 km/hr, freight, 27. The
scheduled times are much faster. Sudan Railways must have the world
record for late trains; for 1982 98.4% of all passenger trains and 98.8%
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of all freight trains arrived late. This record has been consistent
now for 10 years. Furthermore, the degree of lateness is often substan-
tial; on the long runs it is not unusual for a train to be 12 hours
late. The freight car turnaround time averages 21.9 days; the figure
has improved slightly since 1978, but compares very unfavorably with a
figure of 9 to 10 days from 1964 to 1970. The average load per car
(1981) was 25, net load per train, 475. This figure has changed very
little in a decade. The average length of haul (1982) was 930 km; this
also has changed little.
In 1982 there were about 35,000 employees, of which 7,000 were
engineers, accountants and other professionals. The number has not
changed much since 1976, but is considerably higher than in years prior
to 1976.
The Traffic by Line
Table 10 also provided data of freight traffic by major line seg-
ment. These are tonnage figures rather than ton kilometers, but to the
extent that the traffic travels over the entire segment, the figures
are the same as ones of tkm per km. The heaviest line is from Port
Sudan to Haiya, which carries the traffic of both the main line and the
Kassala line, with 1.7 million tons. This is relatively heavy, but
less so than the heaviest lines in Africa and much lighter than major
lines in the U.S. The line to El Obeid with 715,000 is a moderately
heavy line (comparable to the Tanzania Central line). The lines to
Wadi Haifa and to Wau, with roughly 50,000 are the very light traffic
routes. These have both improved, however, since 1978. The figures by
year fluctuate substantially with crop harvests. Only the Karima line
shows a significant drop in recent years.
The Traffic Flows
Since virtually all imports come in through Port Sudan; the route
inbound from the port carries substantial volumes of machinery and other
manufactured goods, fertilizer, sugar, wheat, and petroleum products
(only diesel fuel moves by the pipeline). Much of this goes to Khartoum,
but a substantial amount moves outward on the other lines as well, plus
goods produced in Khartoum, including many food products. The heavy
flows toward Khartoum and to Port Sudan are the basic agricultural
products: ground nuts, dura, sesame, cotton, hides and skins, and gum
arabic. In 1982, the export traffic was 304,000 tons, import traffic,
997,000, local 270,000, livestock, 6,000. The 1978 figures (in 000s)
were 509, 1218, 385, and 27, respectively.
Table 11 shows the relative importance of various major categories
of traffic, in terms of tons, for 1982 and for the average for the five
years ending in 1982. Thus petroleum products constitute the largest
single category, yielding from 25 to 29% of the total tonnage, despite
the pipeline from Port Sudan to Khartoum. Agricultural products, in
total, exceed petroleum, varying from year to year with crop yields.
Of this category, rice, wheat, and flour, partly domestic, partly im-
ported, constitute the largest single item, followed by ground nuts and
sugar. The miscellaneous category, made up primarily of manufactured
goods of all types, yields one-fifth to one-sixth. Fertilizer and
cement are other major categories. If 1982 is compared with the
-to-
Table 11
Sudan Railways
Traffic by Major Commodity, 1982, 1978/82
1982
Average
1978/82
Category
tons
(000s)
% of
total
tons
(000s)
% of
total
Petroleum products 473 29 490 25
Agricultural products:
Rice, wheat, flour
Ground nuts
Sugar
Cotton, cottonseed
Sesame
Maize, millet
Other
163
122
103
50
47
18
22
10
8
6
3
3
1
_1
217
130
150
95
50
84
61
11
7
8
5
3
4
_3
Total 525 32 787 41
Fertilizer 72 4 83 4
Cement 106 7 108 6
Miscellaneous 410 26 416 22
Railroad traffic 40 2 42 2
Total 1626 100 1929 100
five-year average, agricultural products have fallen somewhat, par-
ticularly cotton, while, petroleum, cement, fertilizer, and miscellaneous
have remained relatively constant.
Transfer Traffic
Table 12 shows the behavior of traffic since 1975. Passenger traf-
fic (passenger kilometers) was 13% less in 1982 than in 1975—but the
figure for 1981 was higher than in 1975; there is no obvious continuing
trend. The volume of freight traffic is down 30% over a decade (though
this is not a smooth trend; 1982, for example, was higher than 1979).
But there has definitely been a continuing loss in traffic over the
decade.
Table 12
Changes in Freight and Passenger Traffic Volumes 1975-1982
(millions)
Passenger P/km Freight T/km
1975 1,101 2,175
1976 1,166 2,620
1977 1,294 2,415
1978 1,192 1,555
1979 1,057 1,456
1980 1,061 1,966
1981 1,170 1,594
1982 900 1,512
Source: Sudan, Transport Statistical Bulletin , 1981/82.
Rates
The freight rate structure is still based on value of service as
well as loading characteristics, but with relatively low rates on com-
modities which are regarded as consumer sensitive, such as basic foods
and petroleum products.
Typical rates, as of September 1982, are shown in Table 13,
Table 13
Typical Rates , Sudan Railways , 1982
Rate Per Ton
Groundnuts 24.50
Cotton 30.60
Cement (local) 24.50
Hides and skins 56.70
Sugar 24.50
Gum arabic 24.50
Fertilizer 24.50
Textiles 48.90
Machinery 56.70
Electrical goods 50.10
Diesel fuel 23.75
Rate Per
To n Kilometer
3 1
3. 9
3 1
7 2
3 1
3 1
3 1
6 9—
7 ,2
6 .4
3 .0
The rates taper with distance; for example, on diesel fuel, the rate
per ton km from Port Sudan to Khartoum, as noted above, is 3.0 pt; to
Nyala, 2174 km or 3 times the distance, 1.7.
The overall cost per ton kilometer is 3.8 pt—using the railroad's
allocation of cost between freight and passenger service.
The average passenger fares (1982) are—first class, 3.1 pt per km;
second, 2.4; third, 1.0.
Because of the number of exchange rates and overvaluation it is
difficult to convert this to U.S. cents in any scientific way. At the
1.28 more or less official rate in 1982, this would be 4.7 U.S. cents
per ton mile, at the unofficial rate, 3.5 cents per ton mile.
The Problems and Causes
-48-
1
That the rail system is in acute difficulties is widely recognized.
There are two major aspects of the problem, closely interrelated: the
loss in rail traffic and the poor service on remaining traffic; and
deficits.
The Traffic Loss . As noted above, the system has lost traffic over
the last decade, a loss of about 30% from 1975 to 1982. By contract,
road traffic has increased sharply; the following table indicates the
shift from 1971 to 1980— and there has likely been further shift in the
last two vears.
Traffic, Ton Kilometers Percentage Distribution
Year (millions)
Rail Road River Pipeline Total Rail Road River Pipeline
1971 2683 920 90 — 3693 73 25 2
1981 1908 3570 65 275 5818 33 61 1 5
Thus in a decade the rail share has 'fallen from three-fourths to one-
third, and road has increased from one-fourth to over 60 percent.
There are several reasons:
1. Poor service on the railway and inability to handle all avail-
able traffic. There are long delays; service is not reliable, and cars
are not available for the traffic. There are, in turn, several causes;
it is difficult to attach weights to these.
This portion of the paper is based primarily on information sup-
plied by the Sudan Department of Finance and Economic Planning; the
World Bank; USAID paper, Railway Rehabilitation , February 1982; and the
article, Sudan Railways: Terminally 111? , Sudanow , November 1982, pp.
17-18.
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a. Poor communications. A.s in Tanzania, but apparently to a
greater degree, poor communication seriously slows down freight
and passenger service. The token system does not function
properly because the communications lines between stations do
not operate. Other communications are equally bad. Thus trains
are delayed for long periods waiting for knowledge that the
other trains have cleared the section.
b. Bad track conditions, especially in the west; lack of adequate
ballast and defective sleepers result in many slow orders, often
to 10 km per hour. Bad track results in freauent derailments,
which, coupled with the poor communications, can result in de-
lays of several days. Washouts are frequent in the spring;
service in the west becomes particularly unreliable from April
on into summer.
c. Inadequate usable locomotives and freight cars. As noted, a
substantial percentage of the diesels is not in operating
order, as well as at least one-third of the freight cars. Thus
while the totals might be adequate if they were functioning, in
fact the numbers are seriously inadequate. Even relatively
new diesels are not operable. The problem is in large measure
one of lack of spare parts and of foreign exchange to acquire
them. In the past when the port of Port Sudan was operated by
the railway the latter had its own source of foreign exchange;
when it lost jurisdiction over the port it lost this source
and must rely on the Bank of Sudan. Reportedly the railway
does not get high priority. One estimate is that of the 1,716
-50-
freight cars out of service, at least 1,200 could function if
1
parts were available.
The equipnent problem is aggravated by the antiquated
equipment in the workshop in Atbara and some loss of trained
personnel to the Gulf states.
d. Shortages of diesel fuel, very severe in the past year in the
whole economy. A. train may get to the end of its run' and not
be able to return for lack of fuel.
e. Attitudes of labor. While this is difficult to quantify, re-
portedly worker productivity is low and morale is poor.
Shortages of trained personnel affect not only equipment main-
tenance but overall operation of the railroad as well.
Poor service not only lessens the attractiveness to the users, but
it also aggravates the equipment problem because it results in slow
turnaround time.
While it is difficult to document, it is generally agreed in the
Sudan that a considerable amount of traffic loss is a result simply of
inability of the railroad to move all traffic available to it. But in
addition, the poor service has enabled road transport, despite its
own fuel and spare parts problems, to gain a large portion of the
traffic.
2. The rate structure. The value of service nature of the tariff,
as in the U.S. and elsewhere, has enabled road transport to capture a
large portion of the high-value manufactured goods traffic while it
"Sudan Railway," Sudanow , op . cit . , p. 18.
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cannot compete on the low value goods which have relatively low rail
rates.
3. Completion of the paved highway from Port Sudan to Khartoum in
1978. More than any one other event, this sharply increased the ability
of road transport to compete, both cost and timewise, on the merchandise
and other traffic to Khartoum. It is estimated that over half of the
traffic between the port and Khartoum goes by road.
4. Completion of the pipeline from Port Sudan to Khartoum, which
diverted substantial traffic from rail. This line handles only diesel
fuel (gas oil) , and petroleum remains a major revenue source for the
railroad.
5. Marketing of rail service. The railroad management reportedly
has been slow to move in the direction of actively soliciting traffic.
Total traffic, rail and road, has been restricted by foreign ex-
change problems, which seriously restrict imports and, for a period, by
the decline in agricultural production, particularly of cotton, a trend
that now has been reversed.
The Deficits . As shown in Table 14, the operating deficit as re-
ported by the railroad has never been substantial, even in recent years.
But real costs are significantly in excess of reported costs because of
the deferment of maintenance of track and equipment. The overall
deficit, in 1982, was estimated to be Ls 26 million, which of course
has to be made up from government revenues at a time when the government
is experiencing serious budget deficits. The deficit is easy to explain:
-yz-
Table 14
Sudaa Railways, Revenue, Cost, and Profits,
1938, 1958, 1969 and 1975-81
Ls millions
Year Revenues Oper. Oper. Oper.
Ending in Freight Passenger Total Expenses Profit Ratio
19 38
19 58
1969
1975
1976
1977
1973
1979
1980
1981
19 .
6
5.4
27.2 5.9
25.9 7.7
24.0 9.0
30.1 8.7
42.7 10.1
46.5 9.6
1982 55.0 11.0 66.0 6977 -3.7 1.06
Source: Sudan, Transport Statistical Bulletin, 1981/82.
17.1 16.6
25.0 27.0
33.1 29.3
33.6 31.6
33.0 32.7
39.0 45.8
52.9 55.3
56.1 63.9
.50
.73
.5 .97
-2.0 1.08
3.3 .90
2.0 .94
.3 .99
-6.3 1.18
-2.4 1.05
-7.8 1.13
1. The traffic loss, as noted; it is virtually impossible for a
railroad to reduce costs in proportion to a decline in traffic, and
thus cost per ton/km rises.
2. The use of artificially low rates on a number of basic commodi-
ties, held low by the government for political and development reasons,
The railroad is not free to set its own rates.
3. Delays by government agencies in paying amounts owed the rail-
road.
4. Low labor productivity, which raises labor costs. There are
varying explanations: the inefficient machinery and lack of spare
parts, for example. Others attribute the problem to a strong labor
union and craft union rules that restrict the work individuals can do.
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Sut workers claim that wages are unreasoaably low, that living condi-
tions at many points are very bad; that water is often not available
for track workers.
5. In the past few years, sharp increases in fuel costs and in
wages, not compensated for by equivalent increases in revenue.
Importance of the Railroad
Despite the traffic loss the railroad continues to play a major
role in the economy of the country, particularly in the areas away from
Khartoum. The road network is still very limited in much of the
country. The AID Report, Railway Rehabilitation
,
PL 480 Title III,
February 1982, provides some excellent examples of the importance of
the railway to economic activity in Kordofan and Darfur, for exports
of farm products and imports to the area, both of which depend pri-
marily on rail. Examples quoted from the Report
,
with regard to towns
in North Kordovan include:
Umm Rawabah: "All of the (groundnut) factories...
rely almost exclusively on the railway for shipping
their product to Khartoum and Port Sudan" (p. 6).
"The cotton stored at Seraeih is transported to
Khartoum and Port Sudan by rail" (p. 7).
Al Rahad: "Al Rahad depends almost exclusively on the
railway for shipping products out and bringing prod-
ucts in" (p. 8).
Nyala: "All of the city's staples, most notably sugar
and flour, are brought in bv rail from Khartoum and
Port Sudan. . .According to merchants in the area, prod-
ucts brought into Nyala by rail are vital to the oper-
ation of the economy" (p. 10).
"It was apparent throughout this trip that it is the
railroad which serves as the focal point for village
and town activity from Kosti westward" (p. 11).
-34-
The government and international agencies have likewise stressed
the importance of improvements to the railway, for example in the
1982/S3 public investment program, "...the railways, which provide the
most cost effective means of moving large tonnages over long dis-
tances...." While good comparative cost data are not available,
there is widespread belief that rail costs are lower than road trans-
port costs.
The Future
Substantial amounts have been allocated for the railways in the
development budget in recent years. In the 1930 and 1981 years, however,
only a small portion—about 10 percent—was actually used. In 1982,
Ls 78 million had been allocated; 1972, Ls 72 million used. In the
five-year period 1977/81, 17 percent had been utilized, primarily for
freight cars and locomotives. The 1982/33 budget provides Ls 78.6
million, of which Ls 63.3 million is foreign, provided by various
donors and lenders. The two major items are for track repair, Ls 28
million and freight cars, Ls 26 million. Over two decades there have
2
been four World Bank railway loans"" and a fifth project is now being
negotiated, primarily for* spare parts. US AID has been providing
assistance for communications from Babanousa to Wau, drilling of wells
along the line, and replacement of wooden sleepers on a 160 km stretch
on the line to Nyala.
Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, Three Year Public
Investment Program, 1982/83-1984/85 (Khartoum, 1982), p. 19.
2
The earlier ones were: 1958, S39 million (IBRD); 1965, $31
million (IBRD); 1974, 324 million (IDA).
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3ut despite these development funds and external assistance, the
system has continued to deteriorate and traffic to fall. Two theories
can be advanced about future trends. One is that the improvements to
date have involved too much patchwork and not enough basic improvement
of track, and equipment, and inadequate establishment of priorities.
Complete rebuilding of the system would be very expensive, however, re-
quiring substantial foreign funds that are not likely to be available.
But some properly designed physical improvements, particularly in com-
munications, spare parts, and diesel and freight car maintenance, may
enable reasonably efficient operation with not too much additional
capital. This is based on the view that the capital funds in the past
have not been allocated on an optimal basis.
The other theory is that the troubles lay primarily with management
and labor. There seems to be little question about the competency of
top management; the problem appears at the middle management levels, and
with labor union policies and attitudes. Some technical assistance in
management, according to this approach, could be of great assistance,
but reportedly top management regards this as unnecessary. Improved
labor attitudes are even more difficult to implement, although more
effective techniques of labor relations by management could assist.
In summary ; As of 1983, Sudan Railways continues to play a major
role in the economy, particularly in those areas in which the road net-
work is very limited. Some of the Khartoum-Port Sudan traffic probably
can be recovered from road transport by changes in the rate structure.
Hopefully the efficiency of the system can be turned around, but some
technical assistance from abroad at management levels appears to be
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essential; mere changes in "hardware" alone may not solve the problems.
On the other side of the picture, more reasonable charges for diesel
fuel for highway use (they are among the lowest in Africa) and more
effective action to prevent overloading on the Port Sudan highway should
assist in obtaining a more optimal balance of traffic between rail and
road.
PART IV
SUMMARY
Table 15 summarizes basic data for the five systems, although infor-
mation on all categories is not available for all lines. The Sudan
system is the largest in terras of mileage, but the Zimbabwe system in
ton kilometers, with three times the ton/km of the Sudan railways. Thus
it has by far the highest traffic density—1,800,000 ton/km per km.
It likewise has by far the highest number of ton/km per employee, 8
times as much as the Tanzania and Sudan systems, and about one-fourth
as great as in the United States, despite the lower traffic density
compared to the U.S. Sudan Railways has by far the greatest number of
employees and the greatest number per kilometer. Some of the advantages
of Zimbabwe Railways are a product of the heavier traffic density, but
some obviously reflect a difference in the training of employees and
the overall efficiency of operation. Data are not sufficient to allow
separation of the relative influence of these various items.
In general, on the basis of studies in other countries, the traffic
density on all systems is high enough to allow reasonably low cost
operation although not nearly as low as it would be if the lines had the
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traffic density of the major routes in the U.S. But none of the systems
have density as low as the lowest traffic lines in the U.S. though a
few individual branches in some countries do.
The earnings pictures do not differ as much as might be expected.
The Zimbabwe and Tanzania lines show an operating profit after deprecia-
tion; the Sudan and Zambia lines a small deficit. In no case are the
railroads a serious drain on government tax revenues. But when inter-
est costs are considered as well, none of the systems show a profit.
Zimbabwe Railways show the largest deficit, equivalent to about $45
million US dollars, and the Sudan system about US $18 million. The
Tanzania figure is roughly $3 million (any attempt at conversion to a
common denominator suffers from the non-free-market-exchange-rates
problem). But the governments, while preferring to avoid these deficits,
typically regard them as inevitable if the railroads are to make maxi-
mum contribution to economic development.
A major feature in all of the countries except Zimbabwe is the in-
ability to handle all traffic available; the CIDA estimate in Tanzania
is that the railroad can handle only about half of the traffic that would
be available to it. There are frequent references to this problem in
the Sudan and Zambia has, for example, asked that maize coming up from
the south be shipped by road rather than rail because of lack of rail
capacity.
There are several reasons, much the same in the various countries:
especially in Tanzania and the Sudan, poor track conditions, mainly
ballast and poor communications for control of trains; inadequate equip-
ment maintenance, arising from lack of spare parts and trained personnel;
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and general shortages of management and technical personnel in all four
countries. The relatively poor service arising from these same sources
causes further loss in traffic and poorer utilization of equipment.
Especially in Sudan on the major Port Sudan-Khartoum route, and to
some extent in Zimbabwe, traffic in manufactured goods has been lost be-
cause of the value of service nature of the tariffs. Only Tanzania
has shifted from such a tariff to one based on cost of handling.
While it is difficult to come up with adequate comparative data,
there is strong evidence in all four countries that rail costs are lower
than road transport costs except on short distances—under 100 to 200 km.
The most careful study available, by CIDA in Tanzania, shows that road
transport costs are three to seven times rail costs. Rail transport
likewise places substantially less drain on foreign exchange, per ton/km
of traffic.
Passenger service remains of some importance; volumes have fallen
primarily because of inadequate capacity. Third class fares are very
low by any standards—but cars are crowded and standards have fallen,
except on the main line passenger trains in Zimbabwe.
Steam locomotives have been phased out except for some switching
service in Tanzania and the Sudan; only Zimbabwe has rebuilt and re-
tained in service a number of coal burning locomotives for main line
service. The heaviest traffic line in that country, one of the heaviest
in Africa, is being electrified. Rail, most of which is light by U.S.
standards, ranging from 45 lb. per yard to over 100, is gradually being
upgraded, 56 to 80 on main lines in Tanzania, 75 to 90 in the Sudan.
-60-
The governments, without exception, place strong emphasis on the
importance of improved rail service, and considerable '/orld Bank, and
foreign donor aid have been obtained to improve the systems. The future
of rail transport in Africa depends in large measure on the ability of
the rail systems to improve efficiency and increase their carrying
capacity and to revise their tariffs to avoid loss of high value mer-
chandise traffic. The governments, in addition to providing financial
assistance, can aid in attaining an optimal balance between rail and
road transport by adequate user charges on road transport, prevention
of overloading, and concentrating road construction over the next decade
on feeder roads rather than on ones paralleling rail lines.
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